Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs?

Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs? We explore the distinguishing characteristics of firms that completed or ended share repurchase programs. Our findings help further understanding of the economic reasons for cancelling such programs. Based on a U.S. sample of 457 completed and 79 non-completed repurchase programs, we find a significant drop in systematic risk around completed buybacks. This suggests a response to deteriorating investment opportunities. In contrast, the systematic risk of non-completers decreases prior to the announcement, followed by an increase that peaks during the event period. This suggests that firms cancel their repurchase intentions when growth options move into the money. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Managerial Science Springer Journals

Why do firms decide to stop their share repurchase programs?

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject
Business and Management; Business and Management, general; Accounting/Auditing; Banking; Marketing; Business Strategy/Leadership
ISSN
1863-6683
eISSN
1863-6691
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11846-016-0206-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We explore the distinguishing characteristics of firms that completed or ended share repurchase programs. Our findings help further understanding of the economic reasons for cancelling such programs. Based on a U.S. sample of 457 completed and 79 non-completed repurchase programs, we find a significant drop in systematic risk around completed buybacks. This suggests a response to deteriorating investment opportunities. In contrast, the systematic risk of non-completers decreases prior to the announcement, followed by an increase that peaks during the event period. This suggests that firms cancel their repurchase intentions when growth options move into the money.

Journal

Review of Managerial ScienceSpringer Journals

Published: Aug 19, 2016

References

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