Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Where Do Financial Constraints Originate from? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets

Where Do Financial Constraints Originate from? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and... Despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints, the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed. This paper offers such an analysis. We study, in particular, the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a unique survey data on Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The survey data suggest that adverse selection is empirically more prevalent than moral hazard in the capital markets that the SMEs face. We also find that of the variables indicating the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, the former has more explanatory power in regressions modeling the availability of external finance to the SMEs than the latter. Finally, we document that our proxies for adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related to the age of firms, just like Peter Diamond’s (1989) model predicts. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Small Business Economics Springer Journals

Where Do Financial Constraints Originate from? An Empirical Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Capital Markets

Small Business Economics , Volume 27 (5) – Jul 7, 2005

Loading next page...
1
 
/lp/springer_journal/where-do-financial-constraints-originate-from-an-empirical-analysis-of-cqNgMfT3hN

References (51)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by Springer
Subject
Business and Management; Management; Microeconomics; Entrepreneurship; Industrial Organization
ISSN
0921-898X
eISSN
1573-0913
DOI
10.1007/s11187-005-0610-2
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Despite the voluminous and growing literature on financial constraints, the origins of the constraints are hardly ever empirically analyzed. This paper offers such an analysis. We study, in particular, the empirical prevalence of adverse selection and moral hazard in capital markets using a unique survey data on Finnish small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The survey data suggest that adverse selection is empirically more prevalent than moral hazard in the capital markets that the SMEs face. We also find that of the variables indicating the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard, the former has more explanatory power in regressions modeling the availability of external finance to the SMEs than the latter. Finally, we document that our proxies for adverse selection and moral hazard are inversely related to the age of firms, just like Peter Diamond’s (1989) model predicts.

Journal

Small Business EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Jul 7, 2005

There are no references for this article.