Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Daniel Berkowitz, D. Dejong (1998)
Accounting for Growth in Post-Soviet RussiaInstitutional & Transition Economics eJournal
Timothy Frye, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (2000)
‘Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law’Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 16
Nina Budina, Harry Garretsen, Eelke Jong (2000)
‘Liquidity Constraints and Investment in Transition Economies’Economics of Transition, 8
Glen R. Hubbard (1998)
‘Capital Market Imperfections and Investment’Journal of Economic Literature, 36
Timothy Frye, Andrei Shleifer (1996)
The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing HandPublic Choice & Political Economy eJournal
Allan N. Berger, Gregory F. Udell (1998)
‘The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle’Journal of Banking and Finance, 22
Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 16, Number 3—Summer 2002—Pages 153–170 The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Transition Economies
Michael Jensen, William H. Meckling (1976)
‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’The Journal of Financial Economics, 3
Ronald Mann (1998)
Comment on Avery, Bostic and SamolykJournal of Banking and Finance, 22
Steven F Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard, Bruce C. Petersen (1988)
‘Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment’Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1
Pamela Paxton, R. Long (1997)
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables
Steven Fazzari, Bruce Petersen, R. Hubbard (1987)
Financing Constraints and Corporate InvestmentNBER Working Paper Series
Daniel Berkowitz, David N. DeJong (2002)
‘Accounting for Growth in Post-Soviet Russia’Regional Science and Urban Economics, 32
Andrzej Bratkowski, Irena Grosfeld, J. Rostowski (1998)
Investment and Finance in De Novo Private Firms: Empirical Results from the Czech Republic, Hungary, and PolandCorporate Finance: Valuation
D. Storey (1994)
New firm growth and bank financingSmall Business Economics, 6
J. Stiglitz, A. Weiss (1981)
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect InformationThe American Economic Review, 71
(2002)
Property Rights and Finance
Lubomír Lízal, M. Šinger, Jan Svejnar (2001)
Enterprise Breakups and Performance During the Transition from Plan to MarketReview of Economics and Statistics, 83
Michael Jensen, W. Meckling (1976)
Theory of the Firm
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny (1993)
‘Corruption’Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108
Lubomr Lzal, Jan Svejnar (2001)
Investment, Credit Rationing, and the Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence from Czech Panel DataReview of Economics and Statistics, 84
LICOS Centre for Transition Economics LICOS Firm Growth and Survival in a Transition Country: Micro Evidence from Slovenia
Allen Berger, Gregory Udell (1998)
The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth CycleEntrepreneurship & Finance eJournal
Andrei Bratkowski, Irena Grosfeld, Jacek Rostowski (2000)
‘Investment and Finance in De Novo Private Firms: Empirical Results from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’Economics of Transition, 8
Irena Grosfeld, J.-F. Nivet (1999)
Insider power and wage setting in transition: Evidence from a panel of large Polish firms, 1988-1994European Economic Review, 43
Timothy Frye, Andrei Shleifer (1997)
‘The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand’American Economic Review, 87
Ronald Anderson, C. Kegels (1998)
Transition Banking: Financial Development of Central and Eastern Europe
(1984)
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Francesca Pissarides, M. Šinger, Jan Svejnar (2000)
Objectives and Constraints of Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and BulgariaCEPR Discussion Paper Series
Simon Johnson, Daniel Kaufmann, J. Mcmillan, C. Woodruff (2000)
Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after CommunismPublic Economics
Eelke Jong, N. Budina, H. Garretsen (1999)
Liquidity Constraints and Investment in Transition Economies: The Case of Bulgaria
Timothy Frye, E. Zhuravskaya (2000)
Rackets, Regulation and the Rule of LawCEPR Discussion Paper Series
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny (1999)
The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and Their Cures
John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff (2002)
‘The Central Role of Entrepreneurs in Economic Reform’Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16
R. Hubbard (1997)
Capital-Market Imperfections and InvestmentCorporate Finance: Valuation
Simon Johnson, John McMillan, Christopher Woodruff (2000)
‘Why do Firms Hide’Journal of Public Economic, 76
Paul Povel, Michael Raith (2001)
Optimal Investment Under Financial Constraints: The Roles of Internal Funds and Asymmetric InformationMacroeconomics eJournal
Research on financial constraints of very small firms is scarce because it is difficult to observe and measure their transactions. Previous studies on small enterprises in post-communist countries have focused either on the effect of financing constraints on business growth (Budina et al., 2000, Economics of Transition 8(2), 453–475; Bratkowski et al., 2000, Economics of Transition 8(1), 101–116) or on the effect of property rights (Johnson et al., 2002, American Economic Review 92(5), 1335–1357). This paper provides evidence on both. It turns out that financing constraints and property rights considerations affects investment in firms of different age differently. Younger firms face higher information costs and their expansion is more dependent on the availability of internal funds than is the expansion of older firms. This paper also finds that while the financial sector did not channel funds to the most successful businesses, there is evidence that loans were given to firms that had more transparent transactions. Results also indicate that the security of property rights does not influence investment in young firms, which is interpreted to mean that only the most efficient entrepreneurs entered the market. In older small firms, investment is negatively influenced by the index of security of property rights suggesting that these firms might have “secured” their property rights by bribes. Improvements in the security of property rights, therefore, would help more micro enterprises to be born as well as decrease transaction cost of established enterprises.
Small Business Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 22, 2006
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.