We examine the role of public and private interests in the passage of major legislative bills that have governed the rail industry since 1887. Our model of voting patterns in the House and Senate introduces novel measures of industry concentration, competition, and network characteristics. We find that both the level and concentration of rail infrastructure in a state, the presence of water competition, and the level of agricultural production each have a major influence over voting patterns not only for the inception of regulation but also in the major bills that deregulated the industry in the 1970s and in 1980.
Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals
Published: Aug 9, 2013
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