Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification

Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification Erkenn https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0021-9 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification Gregory Stoutenburg Received: 24 August 2017 / Accepted: 24 May 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Neverthe- less, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop their account of infallible foundational justification. In particular, I provide an account of how propositions that moderate foundationalists claim are foundationally justified derive their epistemic support from infallibly known propositions. This is possible when a foundational proposition is coarsely- grained enough to correspond to determinable properties exemplified in experience or determinate properties that a subject insufficiently attends to; one may have inferential justification derived from such a basis when a more finely-grained proposition includes in its content one of the ways that the foundational proposition could be true. 1 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Erkenntnis Springer Journals

Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification

Erkenntnis , Volume OnlineFirst – Jun 6, 2018
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Ontology; Ethics; Logic
ISSN
0165-0106
eISSN
1572-8420
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10670-018-0021-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Erkenn https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0021-9 ORIGINAL RESEARCH Traditional Internalism and Foundational Justification Gregory Stoutenburg Received: 24 August 2017 / Accepted: 24 May 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Several arguments attempt to show that if traditional, acquaintance-based epistemic internalism is true, we cannot have foundational justification for believing falsehoods. I examine some of those arguments and find them wanting. Neverthe- less, an infallibilist position about foundational justification is highly plausible: prima facie, much more plausible than moderate foundationalism. I conclude with some remarks about the dialectical position we infallibilists find ourselves in with respect to arguing for our preferred view and some considerations regarding how infallibilists should develop their account of infallible foundational justification. In particular, I provide an account of how propositions that moderate foundationalists claim are foundationally justified derive their epistemic support from infallibly known propositions. This is possible when a foundational proposition is coarsely- grained enough to correspond to determinable properties exemplified in experience or determinate properties that a subject insufficiently attends to; one may have inferential justification derived from such a basis when a more finely-grained proposition includes in its content one of the ways that the foundational proposition could be true. 1

Journal

ErkenntnisSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 6, 2018

References

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