Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
D. Evans (1988)
Oil PACs and Aggressive Contribution StrategiesThe Journal of Politics, 50
J. Box-Steffensmeier, J. Grant (1999)
All in a Day's Work: The Financial Rewards of Legislative EffectivenessLegislative Studies Quarterly, 24
G. Cox, Eric Magar (1999)
How Much Is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?American Political Science Review, 93
J. Grenzke (1989)
Candidate attributes and PAC contributionsWestern Political Quarterly, 42
John Green (1999)
Financing the 1996 Election
Ruth Jones, Warren Miller (1985)
Financing Campaigns: Macro Level Innovation and Micro Level ResponsePolitical Research Quarterly, 38
J. D. Gopoian (1984)
What makes PACs tick: an analysis of the allocation patterns of economic contributorsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 28
M. Schwartz, F. Sorauf (1993)
Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities.Contemporary Sociology, 22
F. Sorauf, Cornelius Cotter (1985)
Party Organization in American Politics.Political Science Quarterly, 100
J. Endersby, M. C. Munger (1992)
The impact of legislator attributes on union PAC contributionsJournal of Labor Research, 12
J. Grenzke (1989)
Candidate Attributes and Pac ContributionsPolitical Research Quarterly, 42
J. Wright (1985)
PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational PerspectiveAmerican Political Science Review, 79
K. B. Grier, M. C. Munger, B. E. Roberts (1994)
The determinants of industry political activityAmerican Political Science Review, 88
Pamela Paxton, R. Long (1997)
Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables
A. Wilhite, J. Theilmann (1989)
Campaign contributions by political parties ideologyvs. winningAtlantic Economic Journal, 17
L. Sabato (1985)
Pac Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees
C. Wilcox (1989)
Organizational variables and contribution behavior of large PACs: A longitudinal analysisPolitical Behavior, 11
S. Rosenstone, J. Hansen (1993)
Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America
P. Herrnson (1989)
Party campaigning in the 1980s
Richard Hall, F. Wayman (1990)
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional CommitteesAmerican Political Science Review, 84
G. Jacobson (1986)
Party organization and campaign resources: republicans and democrats in 1982Political Science Quarterly, 100
G. Jacobson (1985)
Party Organization and Distribution of Campaign Resources: Republicans and Democrats in 1982Political Science Quarterly, 100
K. Grier, Michael Munger, B. Roberts (1994)
The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978–1986American Political Science Review, 88
Clifford Brown, Lynda Powell, C. Wilcox (1995)
Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nomination Campaigns
D. Dunn (1965)
Policy preferences of party contributors and votersSocial Science Quarterly, 55
R. Jones, W. Miller (1985)
Financing campaigns: macro level innovation and micro level responseWestern Political Quarterly, 38
C. Wilcox (1989)
Organizational variables and the contribution behavior of large PACsPolitical Behavior, 11
Thomas Stratmann (1992)
Are Contributors Rational? Untangling Strategies of Political Action CommitteesJournal of Political Economy, 100
J. Snyder (1990)
Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986Journal of Political Economy, 98
Robert Biersack, P. Herrnson, C. Wilcox (1994)
Risky business? : PAC decisionmaking in congressional elections
T. Gais (1996)
Improper Influence: Campaign Finance Law, Political Interest Groups, and the Problem of Equality
K. Poole, T. Romer (1985)
Patterns of political action committee contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the United States House of RepresentativesPublic Choice, 47
N. Roberts (1986)
Risky Business
J. Gopoian, Hobart Smith, William Smith (1984)
What Makes PACs Tick? An Analysis of the Allocation Patterns of Economic Interest GroupsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 28
Joseph Galaskiewicz, D. Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, D. Scott (1992)
Money Talks: Corporate Pacs And Political Influence
James Endersby, Michael Munger (1992)
The impact of legislator attributes on union PAC campaign contributionsJournal of Labor Research, 13
Henry Brady, K. Schlozman, S. Verba (1999)
Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political ActivistsAmerican Political Science Review, 93
Gregory Wawro (2001)
A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call VotesAmerican Journal of Political Science, 45
P. S. Herrnson (1989)
National party decisionmaking, strategies, and resource distribution in congressional electionsWestern Political Quarterly, 42
T. Rudolph (1999)
Corporate and Labor PAC Contributions in House Elections: Measuring the Effects of Majority Party StatusThe Journal of Politics, 61
S. Verba, K. Schlozman, Henry Brady (1996)
Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics
K. Grier, Michael Munger (1993)
Comparing Interest Group PAC Contributions to House and Senate Incumbents, 1980-1986The Journal of Politics, 55
F. J. Sorauf (1988)
Money in American Elections
J. Theilmann, A. Wilhite (1991)
Discrimination and Congressional Campaign Contributions
Edward Handler, J. Mulkern (1982)
Business in politics : campaign strategies of corporate political action committees
K. Poole, T. Romer (1985)
Patterns of PAC contributions to the 1980 campaigns for the U.S. HousePublic Choice, 47
Employing data from a recent national survey on campaign finance, we examine the contribution behavior of individual citizens in the 2000 election. By disaggregating types of contributions, our model enables us to observe potential heterogeneity in the determinants of giving money to parties and candidates. We find that for both types of contributions, the effects of informational resources and solicitation on the decision to contribute outweigh those of financial resources. In addition, we propose both a theoretical and an empirical distinction between the selection effects of solicitation and the stimulus effects of solicitation. By distinguishing between these dual dimensions of solicitation, our analysis provides new insight into the causal linkages between income, solicitation, and contributions. We find that while solicitation increases the likelihood of contributing through selective targeting or rational prospecting, it also does so through a stimulus mechanism.
Political Behavior – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 10, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.