The Shoulders of Giants: A Case for Non-veritism about Expert Authority

The Shoulders of Giants: A Case for Non-veritism about Expert Authority Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop an alternative explanation of expert authority that I call the epistemic facility account, arguing that having a certain type of competence in a subject matter or domain of subject matters is sufficient for explaining expert authority while avoiding the problems with veritistic accounts. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Topoi Springer Journals

The Shoulders of Giants: A Case for Non-veritism about Expert Authority

Topoi , Volume 37 (1) – Sep 2, 2016

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Philosophy of Science; Philosophy of Technology
ISSN
0167-7411
eISSN
1572-8749
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11245-016-9421-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Among social epistemologists, having a certain proportion of reliably formed beliefs in a subject matter is widely regarded as a necessary condition for cognitive expertise. This condition is motivated by the idea that expert testimony puts subjects in a better position than non-expert testimony to obtain knowledge about a subject matter. I offer three arguments showing that veritism is an inadequate account of expert authority because the reliable access condition renders expertise incapable of performing its social role. I then develop an alternative explanation of expert authority that I call the epistemic facility account, arguing that having a certain type of competence in a subject matter or domain of subject matters is sufficient for explaining expert authority while avoiding the problems with veritistic accounts.

Journal

TopoiSpringer Journals

Published: Sep 2, 2016

References

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