The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants

The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants To learn the patentability of an innovation, both applicant and examiner search through the set of related inventions. The applicant searches first and chooses to reveal his findings to the examiner, who performs a complementary search and decides whether to grant a patent. We analyze this process with a model of bilateral search for information. We show that the applicant may strategically conceal information, and the examiner makes her search contingent upon the revealed information. To remedy information concealment, we focus on two mechanisms: a double-review policy and a commitment mechanism. Both mechanisms induce more revelation of information. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

The Search of Prior Art and the Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11151-016-9514-3
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

To learn the patentability of an innovation, both applicant and examiner search through the set of related inventions. The applicant searches first and chooses to reveal his findings to the examiner, who performs a complementary search and decides whether to grant a patent. We analyze this process with a model of bilateral search for information. We show that the applicant may strategically conceal information, and the examiner makes her search contingent upon the revealed information. To remedy information concealment, we focus on two mechanisms: a double-review policy and a commitment mechanism. Both mechanisms induce more revelation of information.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Apr 6, 2016

References

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