The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict Econ Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1130-z RESEARCH ARTICLE The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict 1 2 Ivan Lopez Cruz · Gustavo Torrens Received: 12 November 2016 / Accepted: 21 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract This paper develops a two-level model of internal and external conflict in which the paradox of power holds for internal conflict, but not for external conflict. In the model, internal conflict is imbedded in a situation of external conflict. Agents in a group fight over the distribution of resources within the group, but they cooperate to fight against other groups. Agents with low economic productivity have an advantage in the internal conflict game because they face a lower opportunity cost for investments in weapons. However, it is easier for more productive groups to mobilize resources for external conflict, and as a result they have an advantage over less productive groups. The model helps to explain why economically unproductive individuals may enjoy high living standards relative to more productive ones, but more developed groups usually defeat and conquer less developed ones. An extension of the model shows that groups with more unequal distribution of productivity might have an advantage http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economic Theory Springer Journals

The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict

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Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Microeconomics; Public Finance
ISSN
0938-2259
eISSN
1432-0479
D.O.I.
10.1007/s00199-018-1130-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Econ Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1130-z RESEARCH ARTICLE The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict 1 2 Ivan Lopez Cruz · Gustavo Torrens Received: 12 November 2016 / Accepted: 21 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract This paper develops a two-level model of internal and external conflict in which the paradox of power holds for internal conflict, but not for external conflict. In the model, internal conflict is imbedded in a situation of external conflict. Agents in a group fight over the distribution of resources within the group, but they cooperate to fight against other groups. Agents with low economic productivity have an advantage in the internal conflict game because they face a lower opportunity cost for investments in weapons. However, it is easier for more productive groups to mobilize resources for external conflict, and as a result they have an advantage over less productive groups. The model helps to explain why economically unproductive individuals may enjoy high living standards relative to more productive ones, but more developed groups usually defeat and conquer less developed ones. An extension of the model shows that groups with more unequal distribution of productivity might have an advantage

Journal

Economic TheorySpringer Journals

Published: May 29, 2018

References

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