The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely... Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the community, especially when the facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by the company siting the facility. Why have opponents of these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This article presents evidence that opponents of siting proposals are much more likely to vote or engage in other collective action, while supporters are more likely to remain passive and not take action to advance their position. The results suggest that political mechanisms for determining host communities for facilities such as town meetings or referenda may not accurately represent the preferences of the community and that opportunities for siting may be missed. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Springer Journals

The Efficiency of Political Mechanisms for Siting Nuisance Facilities: Are Opponents More Likely to Participate than Supporters?

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Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Regional/Spatial Science; Financial Services
ISSN
0895-5638
eISSN
1573-045X
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007883228345
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Public opposition often hinders the siting of nuisance and noxious facilities. However, there is often support for the siting plan within the community, especially when the facility will bring economic development or a compensation package funded by the company siting the facility. Why have opponents of these facilities been so effective compared to supporters? This article presents evidence that opponents of siting proposals are much more likely to vote or engage in other collective action, while supporters are more likely to remain passive and not take action to advance their position. The results suggest that political mechanisms for determining host communities for facilities such as town meetings or referenda may not accurately represent the preferences of the community and that opportunities for siting may be missed.

Journal

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 3, 2004

References

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