The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test

The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test An empirical version of the Lerner index is used to investigate the market power effects of U.S. firms seeking protection under current antidumping law. The market power consequences are examined for each of the three possible resolutions of an antidumping investigation: petition for relief accepted (and duties levied), petition rejected, or petition withdrawn. For each outcome an industry case study is presented and the market power analysis conducted. The results contained herein support the hypothesis that U.S. firms receiving protection enhance their domestic market power, while firms having their petition rejected experience a decrease in market power. The evidence is less clear for plaintiffs who withdraw their antidumping petition prior to its final resolution. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test

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Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007719609300
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

An empirical version of the Lerner index is used to investigate the market power effects of U.S. firms seeking protection under current antidumping law. The market power consequences are examined for each of the three possible resolutions of an antidumping investigation: petition for relief accepted (and duties levied), petition rejected, or petition withdrawn. For each outcome an industry case study is presented and the market power analysis conducted. The results contained herein support the hypothesis that U.S. firms receiving protection enhance their domestic market power, while firms having their petition rejected experience a decrease in market power. The evidence is less clear for plaintiffs who withdraw their antidumping petition prior to its final resolution.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 15, 2004

References

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