The effect of target managerial ownership on the choice of acquisition financing and CEO job retention

The effect of target managerial ownership on the choice of acquisition financing and CEO job... In this paper we report on our investigation into whether the level of target managerial ownership has an effect on acquisition financing choice and target CEO job retention. We find that cash is more likely used to finance acquisitions when target management ownership levels are high. This result is consistent with a reduced monitoring hypothesis, where bidding firm managers seek to avoid the formation of a large block holder that may become an active monitor. We also find evidence specific only to stock deals that the probability of target CEO job retention increases with the level of target managerial ownership. In these cases, it appears the potential benefits associated with retaining certain target managers outweighs any negative consequence associated with creating a new monitoring block. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

The effect of target managerial ownership on the choice of acquisition financing and CEO job retention

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Finance/Investment/Banking; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operations Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11156-012-0280-5
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper we report on our investigation into whether the level of target managerial ownership has an effect on acquisition financing choice and target CEO job retention. We find that cash is more likely used to finance acquisitions when target management ownership levels are high. This result is consistent with a reduced monitoring hypothesis, where bidding firm managers seek to avoid the formation of a large block holder that may become an active monitor. We also find evidence specific only to stock deals that the probability of target CEO job retention increases with the level of target managerial ownership. In these cases, it appears the potential benefits associated with retaining certain target managers outweighs any negative consequence associated with creating a new monitoring block.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Mar 13, 2012

References

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