The effect of target-firm accounting quality on valuation in acquisitions

The effect of target-firm accounting quality on valuation in acquisitions We examine whether acquisitions are more profitable for acquirers when the firms they target disclose higher-quality accounting information. If accounting information reduces uncertainty in the value of the target firm by facilitating a more precise valuation, we predict that managers of the acquiring firm can bid more effectively and pay less to acquire a target firm that has high-quality accounting information. Using a large sample of acquisitions of public firms from 1990 to 2010, we find evidence consistent with our prediction. Specifically, when target firms have higher-quality accounting information, acquirer returns around the acquisition announcement are higher and target returns are lower—consistent with acquirers capturing a greater portion of acquisition gains by paying less for target firms. These findings, which are robust to a variety of controls and alternative measures of uncertainty and accounting quality, suggest that higher-quality accounting information leads to better bidding decisions in acquisitions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

The effect of target-firm accounting quality on valuation in acquisitions

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Accounting/Auditing; Finance/Investment/Banking; Public Finance & Economics
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11142-014-9283-x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We examine whether acquisitions are more profitable for acquirers when the firms they target disclose higher-quality accounting information. If accounting information reduces uncertainty in the value of the target firm by facilitating a more precise valuation, we predict that managers of the acquiring firm can bid more effectively and pay less to acquire a target firm that has high-quality accounting information. Using a large sample of acquisitions of public firms from 1990 to 2010, we find evidence consistent with our prediction. Specifically, when target firms have higher-quality accounting information, acquirer returns around the acquisition announcement are higher and target returns are lower—consistent with acquirers capturing a greater portion of acquisition gains by paying less for target firms. These findings, which are robust to a variety of controls and alternative measures of uncertainty and accounting quality, suggest that higher-quality accounting information leads to better bidding decisions in acquisitions.

Journal

Review of Accounting StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: May 4, 2014

References

  • Earnings quality, insider trading and cost of capital
    Aboody, D; Hughes, J; Liu, J
  • New evidence and perspectives on mergers
    Andrade, G; Mitchell, M; Stafford, E

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