The Effect of State-Private Co-partnership System on Russian Industry

The Effect of State-Private Co-partnership System on Russian Industry In Russia at the turn of the new millennium, the Putin regime introduced a system of state-private co-partnership with corporate private investors. We argue that this policy had the effect of reducing the likelihood that firm managers-investors would adopt suboptimal investment time horizons. The strategy also served to protect state subsidies to corporations and outside investment funds from expropriation. Using firm-level data that are published by the Russian Trading System stock exchange and the SKRIN database that spans 1998–2006, we test the success of this strategy during this formative era for the modern Russian corporation. We find that co-ownership played an important role in generating improved long-term performance, particularly in industries with high asset-specificity. We also show that the policy was most effective in industries in which firms tended to undertake large lump-sum investments. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

The Effect of State-Private Co-partnership System on Russian Industry

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11151-015-9482-z
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In Russia at the turn of the new millennium, the Putin regime introduced a system of state-private co-partnership with corporate private investors. We argue that this policy had the effect of reducing the likelihood that firm managers-investors would adopt suboptimal investment time horizons. The strategy also served to protect state subsidies to corporations and outside investment funds from expropriation. Using firm-level data that are published by the Russian Trading System stock exchange and the SKRIN database that spans 1998–2006, we test the success of this strategy during this formative era for the modern Russian corporation. We find that co-ownership played an important role in generating improved long-term performance, particularly in industries with high asset-specificity. We also show that the policy was most effective in industries in which firms tended to undertake large lump-sum investments.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Sep 10, 2015

References

  • Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment, firm performance, and managerial incentives
    Aggarwal, RK; Samwick, AA

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