The Effect of Information Signals on Strategic Voting in Mock Mayoral Elections

The Effect of Information Signals on Strategic Voting in Mock Mayoral Elections While theoretical work on strategic voting emphasizes the importance of elite messages in persuading minor party supporters to abandon their first preference, few empirical studies have examined this relationship. I argue that while poll results certainly increase the likelihood of changing one’s vote, explicit information signals can increase this probability even more. Furthermore, these effects will be moderated by the presence of a counter message and the sponsor of the explicit information signal. These hypotheses are tested with data generated from two experiments. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Political Behavior Springer Journals

The Effect of Information Signals on Strategic Voting in Mock Mayoral Elections

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Political Science and International Relations; Political Science; Sociology, general
ISSN
0190-9320
eISSN
1573-6687
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11109-008-9080-y
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

While theoretical work on strategic voting emphasizes the importance of elite messages in persuading minor party supporters to abandon their first preference, few empirical studies have examined this relationship. I argue that while poll results certainly increase the likelihood of changing one’s vote, explicit information signals can increase this probability even more. Furthermore, these effects will be moderated by the presence of a counter message and the sponsor of the explicit information signal. These hypotheses are tested with data generated from two experiments.

Journal

Political BehaviorSpringer Journals

Published: Dec 5, 2008

References

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