The effect of controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control on financial restatements: evidence from Taiwan

The effect of controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control on financial restatements:... This study examines the relation between controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control and financial restatements. An analysis of a sample comprising 106 Taiwanese listed firms (53 restating firms vs. 53 non-restating control firms) shows that financial restatements are more likely to occur when there is a greater divergence between controlling shareholders’ board seats control rights and ownership rights. We also find that the excess board seats control of controlling shareholders is positively associated with the materiality and pervasiveness of financial restatements. Overall, these results suggest that the entrenchment incentive from controlling shareholders’ excess control motivates firms to adopt aggressive accounting policies. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

The effect of controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control on financial restatements: evidence from Taiwan

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/the-effect-of-controlling-shareholders-excess-board-seats-control-on-4QW0Gb0wB5
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Finance; Corporate Finance; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operation Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11156-007-0054-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study examines the relation between controlling shareholders’ excess board seats control and financial restatements. An analysis of a sample comprising 106 Taiwanese listed firms (53 restating firms vs. 53 non-restating control firms) shows that financial restatements are more likely to occur when there is a greater divergence between controlling shareholders’ board seats control rights and ownership rights. We also find that the excess board seats control of controlling shareholders is positively associated with the materiality and pervasiveness of financial restatements. Overall, these results suggest that the entrenchment incentive from controlling shareholders’ excess control motivates firms to adopt aggressive accounting policies.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Sep 22, 2007

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off