The effect of CEO ownership on the information content of reported earnings

The effect of CEO ownership on the information content of reported earnings This paper examines the relation between capital market perceptions of earnings quality and CEO equity ownership. Using the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) from annual returns–earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we find that ERCs first increase and then decline across higher levels of CEO ownership with an inflection point around 25% ownership. Using analyst behavior as another proxy for the perceptions of financial analysts, we find that earnings forecasts are more accurate as ownership increases, but once ownership levels reach about 25%, accuracy declines with further increases in ownership. Forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, and analyst following decline and then increase across increasing levels of CEO ownership. Our results suggest that, for low levels of CEO ownership, earnings are perceived as being more informative about future firm performance as ownership increases. However, once ownership levels are high, earnings are perceived as being less informative with further increases in ownership. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

The effect of CEO ownership on the information content of reported earnings

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Finance; Corporate Finance; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operation Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11156-009-0140-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper examines the relation between capital market perceptions of earnings quality and CEO equity ownership. Using the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) from annual returns–earnings regressions as a proxy for investor perceptions of earnings quality, we find that ERCs first increase and then decline across higher levels of CEO ownership with an inflection point around 25% ownership. Using analyst behavior as another proxy for the perceptions of financial analysts, we find that earnings forecasts are more accurate as ownership increases, but once ownership levels reach about 25%, accuracy declines with further increases in ownership. Forecast dispersion, forecast revision volatility, and analyst following decline and then increase across increasing levels of CEO ownership. Our results suggest that, for low levels of CEO ownership, earnings are perceived as being more informative about future firm performance as ownership increases. However, once ownership levels are high, earnings are perceived as being less informative with further increases in ownership.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Jul 18, 2009

References

  • Corporate disclosures by family firms
    Ali, A; Chen, T; Radhakrishnan, S

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