This article employs a real options framework to investigate the design of taxation on both land value and development in a competitive real estate market. We assume that developed properties reduce open space, and thereby harm urban residents. However, ignoring this negative externality, landowners will develop properties sooner than is socially optimal. A regulator can correct this tendency by imposing a positive tax on development or a negative tax on land value. Alternatively, the regulator can implement both instruments simultaneously, in which case an increase in the tax rate on development will be accompanied by an increase in the tax rate on land value, and vice versa.
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Aug 15, 2007
It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.
Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.
All for just $49/month
Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly
Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.
Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.
Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.
All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.
“Hi guys, I cannot tell you how much I love this resource. Incredible. I really believe you've hit the nail on the head with this site in regards to solving the research-purchase issue.”Daniel C.
“Whoa! It’s like Spotify but for academic articles.”@Phil_Robichaud
“I must say, @deepdyve is a fabulous solution to the independent researcher's problem of #access to #information.”@deepthiw
“My last article couldn't be possible without the platform @deepdyve that makes journal papers cheaper.”@JoseServera