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Philos. Technol. (2018) 31:163–167 https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-018-0315-5 EDITOR LETTER Soft Ethics: Its Application to the General Data Protection Regulation and Its Dual Advantage 1,2 Luciano Floridi Published online: 3 June 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 1 Hard and Soft Ethics In a previous article (Floridi 2018), I introduced the distinction between hard and soft ethics. Since the reader may not be familiar with it, let me quickly summarise it here. I will then be able to use it to clarify two issues: the application of soft ethics to the General Data Protection Regulation (henceforth GDPR) and the idea that soft ethics has a dual advantage. Hard ethics is what we usually have in mind when discussing values, rights, duties and responsibilities—or, more broadly, what is morally right or wrong and what ought or ought not to be done—in the course of making choices or taking decisions in general and of formulating new legal norms or challenging existing ones in particular. In short, hard ethics is what may contribute to making or shaping the law. In hard ethics, it is not true that Bought^ implies Bmay^; it is perfectly reasonable to expect that Bought^ may be followed
Philosophy & Technology – Springer Journals
Published: Jun 3, 2018
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