Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Signaling and optimal sorting

Signaling and optimal sorting I consider educational signaling of inherent ability that facilitates sorting of individuals between sectors. More able individuals are more productive in the primary sector, and less able individuals are more productive in the secondary sector. I find signaling may increase but never maximizes welfare, and is more likely to increase welfare the greater is productivity in the secondary sector, and, possibly, the lower is productivity in the primary sector. Consistent with recent increased undergraduate enrollment in the U.S, excessive signaling occurs by less able individuals. If education increases human capital, total welfare likely increases although more individuals may over-invest in education. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economics Springer Journals

Signaling and optimal sorting

Perri, Timothy
Journal of Economics , Volume 126 (2) – Jun 6, 2018
Download PDF
17 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/signaling-and-optimal-sorting-frZma3OgvE
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Economics, general; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Microeconomics; Macroeconomics/Monetary Economics//Financial Economics; Public Finance; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences
ISSN
0931-8658
eISSN
1617-7134
DOI
10.1007/s00712-018-0618-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

I consider educational signaling of inherent ability that facilitates sorting of individuals between sectors. More able individuals are more productive in the primary sector, and less able individuals are more productive in the secondary sector. I find signaling may increase but never maximizes welfare, and is more likely to increase welfare the greater is productivity in the secondary sector, and, possibly, the lower is productivity in the primary sector. Consistent with recent increased undergraduate enrollment in the U.S, excessive signaling occurs by less able individuals. If education increases human capital, total welfare likely increases although more individuals may over-invest in education.

Journal

Journal of Economics – Springer Journals

Published: Jun 6, 2018

References

  • Phishing for phools: the economics of manipulation and deception
    Akerlof, GA; Shiller, RJ
  • Internal labor markets, incentives, and employment
    Altonji, JG; Pierret, C
  • Beyond signaling and human capital: education and the revelation of ability
    Arcidiacono, P; Bayer, P; Hizmo, A
  • Human capital
    Becker, GS
  • Explaining the worldwide boom in higher education of women
    Becker, GS; Hubbard, WHJ; Murphy, KM
  • The analytics of uncertainty and information
    Bickhchandani, S; Hirshleifer, J; Riley, JG
  • Signaling in higher education: the effect of access to elite colleges on choice of major
    Bostwick, V
  • The case against education
    Caplan, B
  • The speed of employer learning and job market signaling revisited
    Habermalz, S
  • Job market signaling of relative position, or Becker married to Spence
    Hopkins, E
  • The theory of assortative matching based on costly signals
    Hoppe, HC; Moldovanu, B; Sela, A
  • The speed of employer learning
    Lange, F
  • Salaries and piece rates
    Lazear, EP
  • Testing for ability when job assignment is a signal
    Perri, TJ
  • Lemons and Loons
    Perri, TJ
  • 2008 Employment law update
    Perritt, HH
  • Education signaling with uncertain returns
    Regev, T
  • Competitive signalling
    Riley, JG
  • Informational equilibrium
    Riley, JG
  • Silver signals: twenty-five years of screening and signaling
    Riley, JG
  • Market signaling
    Spence, M
  • Competitive and optimal responses to signals: an analysis of efficiency and distribution
    Spence, M
  • Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets
    Spence, M
  • The theory of ‘screening’, education, and the distribution of income
    Stiglitz, JE
  • The dual avenues of labor market signaling
    Waldman, M
  • A sorting-cum-learning model of education
    Weiss, A
  • Handbook of labor economics
    Willis, RJ
  • Education and screening
    Wolpin, KI