Econ Theory https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1133-9 RESEARCH ARTICLE Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications 1 2 Umut Dur · Onur Kesten Received: 13 May 2017 / Accepted: 28 May 2018 © Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract We study assignment systems where objects are assigned to agents sequen- tially. Student placement to exam and mainstream schools in the USA and centralized teacher appointment in Turkey are two of many examples. Despite their prevalence in practice, research on sequential systems has been rather limited. We analyze the prop- erties of the systems in use in these places and show that they do not satisfy desirable fairness, welfare, and incentive criteria. It turns out such shortcomings are inherent in more general sequential assignment systems as well. We then analyze preference rev- elation games associated with various sequential systems including those comprising of combinations of well-known mechanisms. Keywords Sequential assignment · Simultaneous assignment · Non-wastefulness · Straightforwardness JEL Classiﬁcation C78 · D61 · D78 · I20 We thank Battal Dogan, ˘ Thayer Morrill, Tayfun Sönmez, Utku Ünver, Alex Westkamp, and seminar participants at University of Texas, Boston College, GAMES 2012, Montreal Matching Workshop, Rochester, Social Choice and Welfare conference, and
Economic Theory – Springer Journals
Published: Jun 5, 2018
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