We analyze the security of a sessional blind signature protocol based on quantum cryptograph and show that there are two security leaks in this protocol. One is that the legal user Alice can change the signed message after she gets a valid blind signature from the signatory Bob, and the other is that an external opponent Eve also can forge a valid blind message by a special attack, which are not permitted for blind signature. Therefore, this protocol is not secure in the sense that it does not satisfy the non-forgeability of blind signatures. We also discuss the methods to prevent the attack strategies in the end.
Quantum Information Processing – Springer Journals
Published: May 27, 2014
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