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Robust political economy: The case of antitrust

Robust political economy: The case of antitrust The notion of robust political economy is applied to antitrust. It is argued that the universalizability of policy rules is crucial if both the knowledge problem and the incentive problem in antitrust are taken seriously. Policy recommendations of Williamson are compared with those of Hayek. It is further argued that the notion of universalizability is central not only with regard to antitrust but also with regard to a host of other policy areas. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Austrian Economics Springer Journals

Robust political economy: The case of antitrust

The Review of Austrian Economics , Volume 19 (3) – Jan 1, 2006

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References (30)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 by Springer Science + Business Media, Inc.
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science; History of Economic Thought/Methodology
ISSN
0889-3047
eISSN
1573-7128
DOI
10.1007/s11138-006-7348-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The notion of robust political economy is applied to antitrust. It is argued that the universalizability of policy rules is crucial if both the knowledge problem and the incentive problem in antitrust are taken seriously. Policy recommendations of Williamson are compared with those of Hayek. It is further argued that the notion of universalizability is central not only with regard to antitrust but also with regard to a host of other policy areas.

Journal

The Review of Austrian EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Jan 1, 2006

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