Risk and Interaction Aversion: Screening Mechanisms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

Risk and Interaction Aversion: Screening Mechanisms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game When the interactions between cooperators (C) and defectors (D) can be partially avoided within a population, there may be an overall enhancement of cooperation. One example of such screening mechanism occurs in the presence of risk-averse agents (loners, L) that are neutral towards others, i.e., both L and its opponent, whatever its strategy, receive the same payoff. Their presence in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game sustains the coexistence of cooperators and defectors far beyond the level attained in their absence. Another screening mechanism is a heterogeneous landscape obtained, for example, by site diluting the lattice. In this case, cooperation is enhanced with some fraction of such inactive, interaction-averse sites. By considering the interplay of both mechanisms, we show that there is an explosive increase in the range of densities, just above the percolation threshold, where neutrality is prevented and loners become extinct, the behavior reverting to the pure PD game. Interestingly, this occurs despite defectors being usually abundant in that region. This has to be compared with the corresponding loner-free region in the undiluted case that, besides being very small, is dominated by cooperators. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Statistical Physics Springer Journals

Risk and Interaction Aversion: Screening Mechanisms in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Physics; Statistical Physics and Dynamical Systems; Theoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics; Physical Chemistry; Quantum Physics
ISSN
0022-4715
eISSN
1572-9613
DOI
10.1007/s10955-017-1873-0
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

When the interactions between cooperators (C) and defectors (D) can be partially avoided within a population, there may be an overall enhancement of cooperation. One example of such screening mechanism occurs in the presence of risk-averse agents (loners, L) that are neutral towards others, i.e., both L and its opponent, whatever its strategy, receive the same payoff. Their presence in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game sustains the coexistence of cooperators and defectors far beyond the level attained in their absence. Another screening mechanism is a heterogeneous landscape obtained, for example, by site diluting the lattice. In this case, cooperation is enhanced with some fraction of such inactive, interaction-averse sites. By considering the interplay of both mechanisms, we show that there is an explosive increase in the range of densities, just above the percolation threshold, where neutrality is prevented and loners become extinct, the behavior reverting to the pure PD game. Interestingly, this occurs despite defectors being usually abundant in that region. This has to be compared with the corresponding loner-free region in the undiluted case that, besides being very small, is dominated by cooperators.

Journal

Journal of Statistical Physics – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 4, 2017

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