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Reviews 102 REVIEWS and corporate governance. Its subjectivist orientation correctly recognizes that “a portfolio of businesses can be swiftly rebalanced, but the capabilities that constitute the productive assets within that portfolio cannot. Nor can the relationships between these capabilities” (pp. 25–6). In “Mises and Lachmann on Human Action” (chapter 3), Stephen D. Parsons reconsiders Lachmann’s criticism of Ludwig von Mises’s strictly a priori methodology. He then turns a criticism on Lachmann himself. Parsons first mounts an argument against Mises’s extreme a priori claims. Unlike Lavoie (1986), who attempted to reinterpret what Mises “really meant” with the a priori by taking a hermeneutical turn, Parsons seems more sensitive to the tensions in Mises’s extreme stance. Mises conflates phenomenology and epistemology; on the other hand he distinguishes a priori knowledge from the theory that is deduced from it, and claims both are necessary to understand human action; likewise, he distinguishes between praxeology and economic theory, but again claims that both are necessary to understand human action (p. 36). Parsons rightly appreciates that “Mises is appealing to a much broader conception of ratio- nality than that operating in rational choice theories” (p. 37). This is something subjectivists ought to emphasize and further clarify. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Austrian Economics Springer Journals

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References (6)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science; History of Economic Thought/Methodology
ISSN
0889-3047
eISSN
1573-7128
DOI
10.1023/A:1007814415636
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

102 REVIEWS and corporate governance. Its subjectivist orientation correctly recognizes that “a portfolio of businesses can be swiftly rebalanced, but the capabilities that constitute the productive assets within that portfolio cannot. Nor can the relationships between these capabilities” (pp. 25–6). In “Mises and Lachmann on Human Action” (chapter 3), Stephen D. Parsons reconsiders Lachmann’s criticism of Ludwig von Mises’s strictly a priori methodology. He then turns a criticism on Lachmann himself. Parsons first mounts an argument against Mises’s extreme a priori claims. Unlike Lavoie (1986), who attempted to reinterpret what Mises “really meant” with the a priori by taking a hermeneutical turn, Parsons seems more sensitive to the tensions in Mises’s extreme stance. Mises conflates phenomenology and epistemology; on the other hand he distinguishes a priori knowledge from the theory that is deduced from it, and claims both are necessary to understand human action; likewise, he distinguishes between praxeology and economic theory, but again claims that both are necessary to understand human action (p. 36). Parsons rightly appreciates that “Mises is appealing to a much broader conception of ratio- nality than that operating in rational choice theories” (p. 37). This is something subjectivists ought to emphasize and further clarify.

Journal

The Review of Austrian EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 16, 2004

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