Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal May Be Useless

Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal May Be Useless Although Holmström's informativeness criterionprovides a theoretical foundation for the controllability principleand interfirm relative performance evaluation, empirical and fieldstudies provide only weak evidence on such practices. This paperrefines the traditional informativeness criterion by abandoning theconventional full-commitment assumption. With the possibility ofrenegotiation, a signal's usefulness in incentive contractingdepends on its information quality, not simply on whether the signalis informative. This paper derives conditions for determining when asignal is useless and when it is useful. In particular, theseconditions will be met when the signal's information quality iseither sufficiently poor or sufficiently rich. (JEL C72,D82). http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Renegotiation and Relative Performance Evaluation: Why an Informative Signal May Be Useless

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1011386104784
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Although Holmström's informativeness criterionprovides a theoretical foundation for the controllability principleand interfirm relative performance evaluation, empirical and fieldstudies provide only weak evidence on such practices. This paperrefines the traditional informativeness criterion by abandoning theconventional full-commitment assumption. With the possibility ofrenegotiation, a signal's usefulness in incentive contractingdepends on its information quality, not simply on whether the signalis informative. This paper derives conditions for determining when asignal is useless and when it is useful. In particular, theseconditions will be met when the signal's information quality iseither sufficiently poor or sufficiently rich. (JEL C72,D82).

Journal

Review of Accounting StudiesSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 3, 2004

References

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