Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets

Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets Review of Industrial Organization 13: 131–151, 1998. 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. ZHIQI CHEN Department of Economics, Carleton University THOMAS W. ROSS and W. T. STANBURY Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia ( and T. D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics (1996/97), Competition Bureau, Industry Canada, Ottawa) I. Introduction Refusal to deal cases have recently received a considerable amount of attention in 1 2 both Canada and the United States. In the Chrysler and Xerox cases the Canadian Competition Tribunal supported the position of the Director of Investigation and Research that these firms should not be permitted to refuse to supply parts to the complainants. In the Kodak case in the United States a jury in California awarded $23.9 million dollars in damages to 10 independent service organizations to which Kodak refused to sell parts. According to Borenstein et al. (1995b, p. 1), there are more than twenty similar cases ongoing in the United States. These refusal to deal cases represent an important new area of antitrust intervention and litigation. The Canadian law on refusal to deal is contained in Section 75 of the 1986 Com- petition Act. It is a rather http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

Refusals to Deal and Aftermarkets

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Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007739221881
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Review of Industrial Organization 13: 131–151, 1998. 1998 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. ZHIQI CHEN Department of Economics, Carleton University THOMAS W. ROSS and W. T. STANBURY Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia ( and T. D. MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics (1996/97), Competition Bureau, Industry Canada, Ottawa) I. Introduction Refusal to deal cases have recently received a considerable amount of attention in 1 2 both Canada and the United States. In the Chrysler and Xerox cases the Canadian Competition Tribunal supported the position of the Director of Investigation and Research that these firms should not be permitted to refuse to supply parts to the complainants. In the Kodak case in the United States a jury in California awarded $23.9 million dollars in damages to 10 independent service organizations to which Kodak refused to sell parts. According to Borenstein et al. (1995b, p. 1), there are more than twenty similar cases ongoing in the United States. These refusal to deal cases represent an important new area of antitrust intervention and litigation. The Canadian law on refusal to deal is contained in Section 75 of the 1986 Com- petition Act. It is a rather

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 6, 2004

References

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