Public Reports, Information Acquisition by Investors, and Management Incentives

Public Reports, Information Acquisition by Investors, and Management Incentives This paper initially provides a general characterization of the relative weight assigned to two performance measures in an optimal linear compensation contract in a two-task principal/agent setting. This characterization is applied to a setting in which the measures are a public report about the firm's performance (e.g., accounting earnings) and its market price. The latter reflects the public report and non-contractible investor information, whose costly acquisition is endogenously determined. The analysis considers both the gross observed price and the filtered price, which excludes the effect of the public report and represents a contractible noisy measure of the investors' non-contractible information. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Accounting Studies Springer Journals

Public Reports, Information Acquisition by Investors, and Management Incentives

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/public-reports-information-acquisition-by-investors-and-management-MYcKbsolYp
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Business and Management; Accounting/Auditing; Corporate Finance; Public Finance
ISSN
1380-6653
eISSN
1573-7136
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1009652723935
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 12 million articles from more than
10,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Unlimited reading

Read as many articles as you need. Full articles with original layout, charts and figures. Read online, from anywhere.

Stay up to date

Keep up with your field with Personalized Recommendations and Follow Journals to get automatic updates.

Organize your research

It’s easy to organize your research with our built-in tools.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

Monthly Plan

  • Read unlimited articles
  • Personalized recommendations
  • No expiration
  • Print 20 pages per month
  • 20% off on PDF purchases
  • Organize your research
  • Get updates on your journals and topic searches

$49/month

Start Free Trial

14-day Free Trial

Best Deal — 39% off

Annual Plan

  • All the features of the Professional Plan, but for 39% off!
  • Billed annually
  • No expiration
  • For the normal price of 10 articles elsewhere, you get one full year of unlimited access to articles.

$588

$360/year

billed annually
Start Free Trial

14-day Free Trial