Public Policy Toward Cable Television: the Economics of Rate Controls. Thomas w. Hazlett and Matthew l. Spitzer.

Public Policy Toward Cable Television: the Economics of Rate Controls. Thomas w. Hazlett and... 274 BOOK REVIEW considered, much attention was given to prices; Hazlett and Spitzer examine other evidence as well. Chapter 3 examines whether or not the necessary conditions for possible welfare- enhancing price controls hold in the cable television industry. Do cable operators actually exercise market power, restricting output below the competitive level, or does their dominance of local video markets stem from efficiency? Hazlett and Spitzer consider three types of evidence: q-ratios, pricing in sole-supplier markets compared to that in duopolistic markets, and case study evidence on whether or not lower-priced competitive entry is viable in average cable markets. All of the evi- dence indicates that cable television operators have, in fact, exercised considerable market power since at least the mid- to late-1980s, suggesting that rate regulation might in fact increase consumer welfare. Subsequent chapters explore the facts surrounding each change of regulatory regime within the cable television industry. To the extent that rate controls bind, cable operators will look for ways around the controls. While some aspects of pro- viding cable television service, such as the investment in cables, are sunk, program menus are highly mobile inputs. Cable operators are therefore likely to respond to binding price controls http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

Public Policy Toward Cable Television: the Economics of Rate Controls. Thomas w. Hazlett and Matthew l. Spitzer.

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/public-policy-toward-cable-television-the-economics-of-rate-controls-DzxtC08lDt
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007796320753
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

274 BOOK REVIEW considered, much attention was given to prices; Hazlett and Spitzer examine other evidence as well. Chapter 3 examines whether or not the necessary conditions for possible welfare- enhancing price controls hold in the cable television industry. Do cable operators actually exercise market power, restricting output below the competitive level, or does their dominance of local video markets stem from efficiency? Hazlett and Spitzer consider three types of evidence: q-ratios, pricing in sole-supplier markets compared to that in duopolistic markets, and case study evidence on whether or not lower-priced competitive entry is viable in average cable markets. All of the evi- dence indicates that cable television operators have, in fact, exercised considerable market power since at least the mid- to late-1980s, suggesting that rate regulation might in fact increase consumer welfare. Subsequent chapters explore the facts surrounding each change of regulatory regime within the cable television industry. To the extent that rate controls bind, cable operators will look for ways around the controls. While some aspects of pro- viding cable television service, such as the investment in cables, are sunk, program menus are highly mobile inputs. Cable operators are therefore likely to respond to binding price controls

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 15, 2004

There are no references for this article.

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off