Potential Competition: The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger

Potential Competition: The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger 186 ANDREW S. JOSKOW orderly end to the restrictions established by the settlement of the AT&T case. The passage of the act also set in motion a series of merger transaction that the antitrust agencies and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) continue to deal with today. We worked on many telecommunications policy issues during the 1996–1997 period when I was Deputy. Today, I want to discuss the experience with the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger investigation. Before I get to that, however, I want to briefly mention another accomplishment in the telecommunications area that oc- curred during this period. That is, the so-called 271 standard established by DOJ, which has been used to evaluate applications for entry into long distance by Bell Operating Companies (BOC). The economic basis for DOJ’s standard is derived from an understanding in modern economic analysis that the problems of efficient regulation arise from a fundamental information disadvantage between the regulated and regulator. Thus, the standard departs from the usual MFJ concerns about leveraging local regulated telephone monopolies in the long distance market. The concern has now shifted to assuring that the regulator has adequate benchmarks so that once the Bell Operating Companies enter the long distance http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

Potential Competition: The Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger

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Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007885001929
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

186 ANDREW S. JOSKOW orderly end to the restrictions established by the settlement of the AT&T case. The passage of the act also set in motion a series of merger transaction that the antitrust agencies and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) continue to deal with today. We worked on many telecommunications policy issues during the 1996–1997 period when I was Deputy. Today, I want to discuss the experience with the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger investigation. Before I get to that, however, I want to briefly mention another accomplishment in the telecommunications area that oc- curred during this period. That is, the so-called 271 standard established by DOJ, which has been used to evaluate applications for entry into long distance by Bell Operating Companies (BOC). The economic basis for DOJ’s standard is derived from an understanding in modern economic analysis that the problems of efficient regulation arise from a fundamental information disadvantage between the regulated and regulator. Thus, the standard departs from the usual MFJ concerns about leveraging local regulated telephone monopolies in the long distance market. The concern has now shifted to assuring that the regulator has adequate benchmarks so that once the Bell Operating Companies enter the long distance

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 16, 2004

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