We investigate how political influence affects executive compensation using a sample of publically listed Chinese firms. Our dataset allows us to examine the interplay between manager political influence that arises through government service and owner political influence that arises through state ownership, as they affect executive compensation. We find that politically connected executives receive greater excess compensation from non-state owned firms, but not from state owned firms. Furthermore, our findings indicate that politically connected managers are rewarded for improved performance only when owners do not have substantial political influence, which is consistent with manager political influence being related to a form of managerial entrenchment that can be mitigated by owner political influence. Conceptually, this study adds to the agency theory literature in the field of corporate governance, as it highlights the owner–manager conflict of interest using political influence as a balance of power.
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 16, 2014
It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.
Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.
All for just $49/month
Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly
Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.
Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.
Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.
All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.
“Hi guys, I cannot tell you how much I love this resource. Incredible. I really believe you've hit the nail on the head with this site in regards to solving the research-purchase issue.”Daniel C.
“Whoa! It’s like Spotify but for academic articles.”@Phil_Robichaud
“I must say, @deepdyve is a fabulous solution to the independent researcher's problem of #access to #information.”@deepthiw
“My last article couldn't be possible without the platform @deepdyve that makes journal papers cheaper.”@JoseServera