Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities

Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities J Ind Compet Trade https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-018-0282-7 1 2 Barna Bako´ · Daniel ´ Fatay ´ Received: 3 November 2017 / Revised: 1 May 2018 / Accepted: 17 May 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of one type derive utility from inter-group interactions, while the other type of agents benefit from intra-group rather than from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-sided markets model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze competing platforms, both with single-homing and multi-homing abilities. Keywords Two-sided markets · Network effect · Platform competition · Single-homing · Multi-homing JEL Classification D4 · L1 · L4 · L5 1 Introduction According to Rochet and Tirole (2003) many markets with network externalities are two- sided markets. In general, these markets are characterized with two distinct sides that benefit from being able to interact with each other through a common platform. Good examples abound from credit cards, computer operating systems and video game consoles to job recruitment agencies and dating sites. The core concept http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" Springer Journals

Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Political Economy/Economic Policy; R & D/Technology Policy; European Integration; Microeconomics; International Economics
ISSN
1566-1679
eISSN
1573-7012
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10842-018-0282-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

J Ind Compet Trade https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-018-0282-7 1 2 Barna Bako´ · Daniel ´ Fatay ´ Received: 3 November 2017 / Revised: 1 May 2018 / Accepted: 17 May 2018 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of one type derive utility from inter-group interactions, while the other type of agents benefit from intra-group rather than from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-sided markets model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze competing platforms, both with single-homing and multi-homing abilities. Keywords Two-sided markets · Network effect · Platform competition · Single-homing · Multi-homing JEL Classification D4 · L1 · L4 · L5 1 Introduction According to Rochet and Tirole (2003) many markets with network externalities are two- sided markets. In general, these markets are characterized with two distinct sides that benefit from being able to interact with each other through a common platform. Good examples abound from credit cards, computer operating systems and video game consoles to job recruitment agencies and dating sites. The core concept

Journal

"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade"Springer Journals

Published: May 28, 2018

References

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