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Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities

Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of one type derive utility from inter-group interactions, while the other type of agents benefit from intra-group rather than from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-sided markets model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze competing platforms, both with single-homing and multi-homing abilities. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png "Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" Springer Journals

Platform Competition with Intra-Group Externalities

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Economic Policy; R & D/Technology Policy; European Integration; Microeconomics; International Economics
ISSN
1566-1679
eISSN
1573-7012
DOI
10.1007/s10842-018-0282-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this article we analyze asymmetric two-sided markets. Two types of agents are assumed to interact with each other and we assume that agents of one type derive utility from inter-group interactions, while the other type of agents benefit from intra-group rather than from inter-group interactions as it is assumed in the standard symmetric two-sided markets model. First, we consider a monopoly platform, then we analyze competing platforms, both with single-homing and multi-homing abilities.

Journal

"Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade" – Springer Journals

Published: May 28, 2018

References

  • Competition in two-sided markets
    Armstrong, M
  • Two-sided markets, competitive bottlenecks and exclusive contracts
    Armstrong, M; Wright, J
  • Information and two-sided platform profits
    Hagiu, A; Halaburda, H
  • Platform competition in two-sided markets
    Rochet, JC; Tirole, J
  • Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?
    Vasconcelos, H
  • A price theory of multi-sided platforms
    Weyl, EG