On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies We study the evolutionary origin of a social norm of the kind “cooperate frequently and share fully” observed in modern hunter–gatherers. In order to do this, a two-stage game in which a pie has first to be produced and then divided is proposed. We assume that the bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior and to the degree of property rights protection. We show that, when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists, a norm of investment and a norm of division coevolve supporting the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The conditions needed for norms to coevolve depend on whether property rights over the fruits of one’s own independent investment are secured or not. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination Springer Journals

On the coevolution of social norms in primitive societies

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Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Subject
Economics; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Computer Appl. in Social and Behavioral Sciences; Theoretical, Mathematical and Computational Physics; Finance, general
ISSN
1860-711X
eISSN
1860-7128
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11403-016-0180-1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We study the evolutionary origin of a social norm of the kind “cooperate frequently and share fully” observed in modern hunter–gatherers. In order to do this, a two-stage game in which a pie has first to be produced and then divided is proposed. We assume that the bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior and to the degree of property rights protection. We show that, when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists, a norm of investment and a norm of division coevolve supporting the efficient investment profile and the egalitarian distribution of the surplus, respectively. The conditions needed for norms to coevolve depend on whether property rights over the fruits of one’s own independent investment are secured or not.

Journal

Journal of Economic Interaction and CoordinationSpringer Journals

Published: Sep 17, 2016

References

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