On Spectrum Trading for 5G Cognitive Spectrum Sharing Networks with Hybrid Access: A Game-Theoretic Approach

On Spectrum Trading for 5G Cognitive Spectrum Sharing Networks with Hybrid Access: A... Cognitive radio (CR) networks employing dynamic spectrum access have been proposed in the framework of enabling 5G wireless networks to enhance efficient use of spectrum resources. Communication requirements with regard to spectrum in 5G networks demand dynamic spectrum access giving rise to new types of spectrum markets and spectrum trading issues. Cognitive secondary users (SUs) may employ opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) to access vacant frequency bands (FBs) primarily allocated to primary users provided that they do not cause interference. Moreover, the SUs can employ exclusive spectrum access (ESA) in FBs leased at a certain price. In this work, different types of spectrum operators (SOs) are considered with regard to the type of spectrum access offered to SUs. A novel two-stage spectrum access and pricing game is proposed for two scenaria, namely: (1) a duopoly comprising an opportunistic SO and an exclusive SO and (2) a monopoly of a hybrid SO offering both ESA and OSA. In the first stage of the game, non coordinated SUs choose the access option that maximizes their utility. This symmetric N-SU spectrum access selection game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium which depends: (1) on the prices set by the SOs in either the duopoly or the monopoly examined and (2) on the bandwidth available to the SUs under each scenario. In the second stage of the game, the bandwidth-pricing policy planned by the SOs is determined as the solution to an optimization problem maximizing the SOs revenues at the SUs equilibrium. Two algorithms are proposed to solve the optimization problems arising in each scenario examined. The numerical results obtained under the two spectrum market scenaria demonstrate how the proposed two-stage spectrum access and pricing scheme behaves for various network parameters. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Wireless Personal Communications Springer Journals

On Spectrum Trading for 5G Cognitive Spectrum Sharing Networks with Hybrid Access: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/on-spectrum-trading-for-5g-cognitive-spectrum-sharing-networks-with-Sn2Y0x0yWI
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Engineering; Communications Engineering, Networks; Signal,Image and Speech Processing; Computer Communication Networks
ISSN
0929-6212
eISSN
1572-834X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11277-017-4828-5
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Cognitive radio (CR) networks employing dynamic spectrum access have been proposed in the framework of enabling 5G wireless networks to enhance efficient use of spectrum resources. Communication requirements with regard to spectrum in 5G networks demand dynamic spectrum access giving rise to new types of spectrum markets and spectrum trading issues. Cognitive secondary users (SUs) may employ opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) to access vacant frequency bands (FBs) primarily allocated to primary users provided that they do not cause interference. Moreover, the SUs can employ exclusive spectrum access (ESA) in FBs leased at a certain price. In this work, different types of spectrum operators (SOs) are considered with regard to the type of spectrum access offered to SUs. A novel two-stage spectrum access and pricing game is proposed for two scenaria, namely: (1) a duopoly comprising an opportunistic SO and an exclusive SO and (2) a monopoly of a hybrid SO offering both ESA and OSA. In the first stage of the game, non coordinated SUs choose the access option that maximizes their utility. This symmetric N-SU spectrum access selection game has a unique mixed strategy equilibrium which depends: (1) on the prices set by the SOs in either the duopoly or the monopoly examined and (2) on the bandwidth available to the SUs under each scenario. In the second stage of the game, the bandwidth-pricing policy planned by the SOs is determined as the solution to an optimization problem maximizing the SOs revenues at the SUs equilibrium. Two algorithms are proposed to solve the optimization problems arising in each scenario examined. The numerical results obtained under the two spectrum market scenaria demonstrate how the proposed two-stage spectrum access and pricing scheme behaves for various network parameters.

Journal

Wireless Personal CommunicationsSpringer Journals

Published: Aug 17, 2017

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off