On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy

On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy We consider a model in which individual preferences are orderings of social states, but the social preference relation is fuzzy. We motivate interest in the model by presenting a version of the strong Pareto rule that is suited to the setting of a fuzzy social preference. We prove a general oligarchy theorem under the assumption that this fuzzy relation is quasi-transitive. The framework allows us to make a distinction between a “strong” and a “weak” oligarchy, and our theorem identifies when the oligarchy must be strong and when it can be weak. Weak oligarchy need not be undesirable. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Social Choice and Welfare Springer Journals

On some oligarchy results when social preference is fuzzy

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/on-some-oligarchy-results-when-social-preference-is-fuzzy-2lUQZuUlR5
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature
Subject
Economics; Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods; Public Finance; International Political Economy; Game Theory, Economics, Social and Behav. Sciences; Social Policy
ISSN
0176-1714
eISSN
1432-217X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s00355-018-1134-4
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We consider a model in which individual preferences are orderings of social states, but the social preference relation is fuzzy. We motivate interest in the model by presenting a version of the strong Pareto rule that is suited to the setting of a fuzzy social preference. We prove a general oligarchy theorem under the assumption that this fuzzy relation is quasi-transitive. The framework allows us to make a distinction between a “strong” and a “weak” oligarchy, and our theorem identifies when the oligarchy must be strong and when it can be weak. Weak oligarchy need not be undesirable.

Journal

Social Choice and WelfareSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 4, 2018

References

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.


DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off