This paper examines strategic investment behaviour when firms have oligopsony power in the input market. Focusing on the labour market, we study how a firm’s labour supply augmenting investment affects the equilibrium when oligopsonistic firms set wages. Relative to a non-strategic benchmark, optimal investment strategies involve boosting investment that leads rival employers to cut wages, but involves cutting back on investment that causes the latter to increase their wages. Implications of existing labour market policies for strategic investment are also discussed. Finally, the model is generalised to nest wage and employment competition and is extended to include other types of investment.
Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals
Published: Aug 19, 2009
It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.
Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.
All for just $49/month
Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly
Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.
All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.
“Whoa! It’s like Spotify but for academic articles.”@Phil_Robichaud