Peter Leeson’s The Invisible Hook provides a readable and entertaining narrative of the hidden economics of the Golden Age of Piracy. This essay comments on one particular aspect of Leeson’s work: what we can learn from pirates about the emergence and evolution of property rights? I conclude that pirate codes had their origins in part in legally enforceable agreements and that pirates’ blend of individual and communal property rights bore some resemblance to the property rights of wandering tribal peoples.
The Review of Austrian Economics – Springer Journals
Published: May 4, 2010
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