Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability

Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability J Value Inquiry (2017) 51:363–381 DOI 10.1007/s10790-016-9583-4 Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability Justin Horn Published online: 22 December 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 Over the last thirty years or so, an increasing number of philosophers have been willing to identify themselves as moral realists. While not all authors mean the same thing by ‘‘moral realism,’’ one common understanding of the position involves three commitments: 1) moral judgments express beliefs, 2) some (non-trivial) moral beliefs are true, and 3) the truth of these beliefs is stance-independent—that is, their truth does not constitutively depend on the attitudes that any (actual or hypothetical) agents bear towards their contents. Virtually all moral realists also endorse an epistemological commitment, namely that 4) many of us have at least some justified (non-trivial) moral beliefs. Let us call the conjunction of these four claims non- skeptical moral realism. The existence of widespread moral disagreement has long been thought to pose a challenge to such a view. The literature on this topic is large, but most attempts at fleshing out the challenge can be divided roughly into two categories. Metaphysical arguments from disagreement contend that the phenomena of (actual or possible) moral disagreement http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Value Inquiry Springer Journals

Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Ontology; Ethics; International Political Economy; Public International Law; Philosophy, general
ISSN
0022-5363
eISSN
1573-0492
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10790-016-9583-4
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

J Value Inquiry (2017) 51:363–381 DOI 10.1007/s10790-016-9583-4 Moral Realism, Fundamental Moral Disagreement, and Moral Reliability Justin Horn Published online: 22 December 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016 Over the last thirty years or so, an increasing number of philosophers have been willing to identify themselves as moral realists. While not all authors mean the same thing by ‘‘moral realism,’’ one common understanding of the position involves three commitments: 1) moral judgments express beliefs, 2) some (non-trivial) moral beliefs are true, and 3) the truth of these beliefs is stance-independent—that is, their truth does not constitutively depend on the attitudes that any (actual or hypothetical) agents bear towards their contents. Virtually all moral realists also endorse an epistemological commitment, namely that 4) many of us have at least some justified (non-trivial) moral beliefs. Let us call the conjunction of these four claims non- skeptical moral realism. The existence of widespread moral disagreement has long been thought to pose a challenge to such a view. The literature on this topic is large, but most attempts at fleshing out the challenge can be divided roughly into two categories. Metaphysical arguments from disagreement contend that the phenomena of (actual or possible) moral disagreement

Journal

The Journal of Value InquirySpringer Journals

Published: Dec 22, 2016

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