Market share and risk taking: the role of collateral asset managers in the collapse of the arbitrage CDO market

Market share and risk taking: the role of collateral asset managers in the collapse of the... Asset pricing theory predicts that if credit ratings do not reflect all relevant aspects of a CDO debt tranche’s risk profile (i.e., its total and systematic risk), then ratings-based tranche pricing by some naïve investors creates incentives for CDO arrangers to take excessive non-priced risk. CDO managers’ desire for repeat issuance makes them part of this risk taking strategy to exploit naïve investors. The implication is that the credit quality of CDOs run by large market share managers has a higher tendency to deteriorate in bad times. This paper finds empirical evidence for large market share manager’s conflicts of interest. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Springer Journals

Market share and risk taking: the role of collateral asset managers in the collapse of the arbitrage CDO market

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Finance; Corporate Finance; Accounting/Auditing; Econometrics; Operation Research/Decision Theory
ISSN
0924-865X
eISSN
1573-7179
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11156-015-0501-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Asset pricing theory predicts that if credit ratings do not reflect all relevant aspects of a CDO debt tranche’s risk profile (i.e., its total and systematic risk), then ratings-based tranche pricing by some naïve investors creates incentives for CDO arrangers to take excessive non-priced risk. CDO managers’ desire for repeat issuance makes them part of this risk taking strategy to exploit naïve investors. The implication is that the credit quality of CDOs run by large market share managers has a higher tendency to deteriorate in bad times. This paper finds empirical evidence for large market share manager’s conflicts of interest.

Journal

Review of Quantitative Finance and AccountingSpringer Journals

Published: Feb 14, 2015

References

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