Market Power in Chinese Taipei: Laws, Policies and Treatments

Market Power in Chinese Taipei: Laws, Policies and Treatments The experience of Chinese Taipei shows that opening up a previously protected market to new entrants can be a more effective and reliable way to enhance competition than regulating the behavior of dominant or monopolistic firms. Moreover, when opening up the market, the liberalizing measures adopted by government should be market-structure-neutral. That is, it should not try to dictate the direction and results of market competition. A more pressure-resistant mechanism should be designed to deal with market power, taking the form of a regime that is cross-sector, independent and collective in its decision-making, such as has been the case with Chinese Taipei's Fair Trade Commission. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

Market Power in Chinese Taipei: Laws, Policies and Treatments

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1019669309809
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The experience of Chinese Taipei shows that opening up a previously protected market to new entrants can be a more effective and reliable way to enhance competition than regulating the behavior of dominant or monopolistic firms. Moreover, when opening up the market, the liberalizing measures adopted by government should be market-structure-neutral. That is, it should not try to dictate the direction and results of market competition. A more pressure-resistant mechanism should be designed to deal with market power, taking the form of a regime that is cross-sector, independent and collective in its decision-making, such as has been the case with Chinese Taipei's Fair Trade Commission.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 13, 2004

References

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