Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry

Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry Using a dataset of calculator auctions on eBay, we first show that last-minute bidding is not merely the result of bidders’ going to the next-to-close auction. Instead, bidding is concentrated at the end of the period in which the auction is the next to close, suggesting the existence of strategic last-minute bidding. Then, we model repeated, ascending price auctions for homogeneous goods with unobserved, stochastic entry. We show that the dynamic game has a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium in which entrants always reveal themselves by bidding in the auction in which they arrive, and bidding occurs at the last minute. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Review of Industrial Organization Springer Journals

Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2011 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
Subject
Economics; Industrial Organization; Microeconomics
ISSN
0889-938X
eISSN
1573-7160
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11151-011-9328-2
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Using a dataset of calculator auctions on eBay, we first show that last-minute bidding is not merely the result of bidders’ going to the next-to-close auction. Instead, bidding is concentrated at the end of the period in which the auction is the next to close, suggesting the existence of strategic last-minute bidding. Then, we model repeated, ascending price auctions for homogeneous goods with unobserved, stochastic entry. We show that the dynamic game has a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium in which entrants always reveal themselves by bidding in the auction in which they arrive, and bidding occurs at the last minute.

Journal

Review of Industrial OrganizationSpringer Journals

Published: Dec 28, 2011

References

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