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- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
- Subject
- Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language
- ISSN
- 0031-8116
- eISSN
- 1573-0883
- DOI
- 10.1007/s11098-017-0931-4
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
It is a widely shared intuition that there is a close connection between knowledge-how and intentional action. In this paper, I explore one aspect of this connection: the normative connection between intending to do something and knowing how to do it. I argue for a norm connecting knowledge-how and intending in a way that parallels the knowledge norms of assertion, belief, and practical reasoning, which I call the knowledge-how norm of Intention. I argue that this norm can appeal to support from arguments which parallel those for other epistemic norms, that it can deal with a number of prima facie problem cases, and that alternative conditions in a norm on intention are implausible.
Journal
Philosophical Studies – Springer Journals
Published: May 20, 2017