Knowledge flows and insider trading

Knowledge flows and insider trading Much insider trading literature focuses on the redistribution of monetary rents. This focus has led to ambiguous and conflicting results, unable to identify who the clear winners and losers of insider trading legislation are. Lacking any clearly defined beneficiary, an analysis of the origins and continued support of such legislation is lacking. This paper rectifies this omission by reassessing the involved agents not in light of their relationship to a company, but from all roles of the knowledge transmission process: creator, distributor and user. Information distributors—large news companies and investment houses—are argued to be sufficiently well organized to lobby for maintained and strengthened legislation to protect rents that would otherwise be greatly diminished. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Austrian Economics Springer Journals

Knowledge flows and insider trading

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by Springer Science+Business Media New York
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Public Finance & Economics; Political Science, general; Methodology and the History of Economic Thought
ISSN
0889-3047
eISSN
1573-7128
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11138-013-0209-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Much insider trading literature focuses on the redistribution of monetary rents. This focus has led to ambiguous and conflicting results, unable to identify who the clear winners and losers of insider trading legislation are. Lacking any clearly defined beneficiary, an analysis of the origins and continued support of such legislation is lacking. This paper rectifies this omission by reassessing the involved agents not in light of their relationship to a company, but from all roles of the knowledge transmission process: creator, distributor and user. Information distributors—large news companies and investment houses—are argued to be sufficiently well organized to lobby for maintained and strengthened legislation to protect rents that would otherwise be greatly diminished.

Journal

The Review of Austrian EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Feb 10, 2013

References

  • Managerial value diversion and shareholder wealth
    Bebchuk, L; Jolls, C
  • Do insider trading laws work?
    Bris, A

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