Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)?

Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)? Philosophia https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9986-5 Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)? Patrick Clipsham Received: 12 December 2017 /Revised: 23 April 2018 /Accepted: 22 May 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Companions in guilt arguments are widespread in defenses of moral realism and criticisms of error theory. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the companions in guilt argument fails because it makes untenable assumptions about the existence of categorical epistemic reasons. In this article, I develop an alternative version of the companions in guilt argument that does not succumb to this criticism, as it begins with the claim that there is a presumptive case in favor of attributing a belief in categorical norms of philosophical argumentation to proponents of the error theory. I then point to an instability in the error-theoretic position and explore the extent to which this instability poses a serious philosophical problem. While this argument has a narrower scope than the traditional companions in guilt arguments, I conclude that it nonetheless poses a significant challenge to any philosophical attempt to deny the categoricity of moral reasons. . . Keywords Metaethics Companions in guilt arguments Metaphilosophy The http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophia Springer Journals

Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)?

Philosophia , Volume OnlineFirst – Jun 2, 2018
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 by Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Ethics; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind; Philosophy of Science
ISSN
0048-3893
eISSN
1574-9274
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11406-018-9986-5
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Philosophia https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-018-9986-5 Is there a Distinct Metaphilosophical Companions in Guilt Argument (and Does it Work)? Patrick Clipsham Received: 12 December 2017 /Revised: 23 April 2018 /Accepted: 22 May 2018 Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018 Abstract Companions in guilt arguments are widespread in defenses of moral realism and criticisms of error theory. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that the companions in guilt argument fails because it makes untenable assumptions about the existence of categorical epistemic reasons. In this article, I develop an alternative version of the companions in guilt argument that does not succumb to this criticism, as it begins with the claim that there is a presumptive case in favor of attributing a belief in categorical norms of philosophical argumentation to proponents of the error theory. I then point to an instability in the error-theoretic position and explore the extent to which this instability poses a serious philosophical problem. While this argument has a narrower scope than the traditional companions in guilt arguments, I conclude that it nonetheless poses a significant challenge to any philosophical attempt to deny the categoricity of moral reasons. . . Keywords Metaethics Companions in guilt arguments Metaphilosophy The

Journal

PhilosophiaSpringer Journals

Published: Jun 2, 2018

References

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