Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for Concern?

Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for Concern? We examine the effects of the regulation of dual agency in residential real estate transactions, for 10,888 transactions in Long Island, New York in 2004–2007. We find that dual agency has an overall null effect on sale price, but includes two opposing forces where buyer and seller interests might be compromised. The link between dual agency and timing of sales is less clear. These findings are robust to endogeneity bias. Although it appears dual agency does cause some market distortions, our analysis yields little evidence that prohibiting dual agency in real estate will increase welfare. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Springer Journals

Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for Concern?

32 pages
Read Article

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer_journal/is-dual-agency-in-real-estate-a-cause-for-concern-P9IsxluQzU
Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics / Management Science; Regional/Spatial Science; Finance/Investment/Banking
ISSN
0895-5638
eISSN
1573-045X
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11146-012-9385-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We examine the effects of the regulation of dual agency in residential real estate transactions, for 10,888 transactions in Long Island, New York in 2004–2007. We find that dual agency has an overall null effect on sale price, but includes two opposing forces where buyer and seller interests might be compromised. The link between dual agency and timing of sales is less clear. These findings are robust to endogeneity bias. Although it appears dual agency does cause some market distortions, our analysis yields little evidence that prohibiting dual agency in real estate will increase welfare.

Journal

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 12, 2012

References

  • Selection on observed and unobserved variables: assessing the effectiveness of catholic schools
    Altonji, J; Elder, T; Taber, C
  • Using selection on observed variables to assess bias from unobservables when evaluating Swan-ganz catheterization
    Altonji, J; Elder, T; Taber, C
  • Antitrust and real estate: a Two-sided approach
    Brown, T; Yingling, K
  • Does it matter whom an agent serves? Evidence from recent changes in real estate markets
    Curran, C.; Schrag, J.
  • Homeowners’ repeat sales gains, dual agency and repeated Use of the same agent
    Evans, R; Kolbe, P
  • The impact of dual agency
    Gardiner, J; Heisler, J; Kallberg, J; Liu, C
  • Confronting information asymmetries: evidence from real estate markets
    Garmase, M; Moskowitz, T
  • Equity and time-to-sale in the real estate market
    Genesove, D; Mayer, C
  • Loss aversion and seller behavior: evidence from the housing market
    Genesove, D.; Mayer, C.
  • Can free entry Be inefficient? fixed commissions and social waste in the real estate industry
    Hsieh, C; Moretti, E
  • An optimal incentive system for real estate agents
    Jares, T; Larsen, J; Zorn, T
  • Market distortion when agents Are better informed: the value of information in real estate transactions
    Levitt, S; Syverson, C
  • Bargaining over residential real estate: evidence from England
    Merlo, A; Ortalo-Magné, F
  • Incentives and performance in real estate brokerage
    Munneke, H; Yavas, A
  • Measuring market power in the Ready-to-eat cereal industry
    Nevo, A
  • Redefining realtor relationships and responsibilities: the failure of state regulatory responses
    Olazabal, A
  • Conflicts between principals and agents: evidence from residential brokerage
    Rutherford, R; Springer, T; Yavas, A
  • For sale by owner: when to use a broker and how to price the house
    Salant, SW
  • Time-on-the-market as a sign of quality
    Taylor, C
  • Interpreting semilogarithmic regression coefficients in labor research
    Thornton, R; Innes, J
  • Vacancy, search, and prices in a housing market matching mode
    Wheaton, W
  • The strategic role of listing price in marketing real-estate: theory and evidence
    Yavas, A.; Yang, S.
  • An experimental analysis of the impact of intermediaries on the outcome of bargaining games
    Yavas, A; Miceli, T; Sirmans, C
  • A search model of real estate broker behavior
    Yinger, J

You’re reading a free preview. Subscribe to read the entire article.

Try 2 weeks free now

DeepDyve is your
personal research library

It’s your single place to instantly
discover and read the research
that matters to you.

Enjoy affordable access to
over 18 million articles from more than
15,000 peer-reviewed journals.

All for just $49/month

Explore the DeepDyve Library

or browse the journals available

Search

Query the DeepDyve database, plus search all of PubMed and Google Scholar seamlessly

Organize

Save any article or search result from DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar... all in one place.

Access

Get unlimited, online access to over 18 million full-text articles from more than 15,000 scientific journals.

Your journals are on DeepDyve

Read from thousands of the leading scholarly journals from SpringerNature, Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford University Press and more.

All the latest content is available, no embargo periods.

See the journals in your area

DeepDyve

Freelancer

DeepDyve

Pro

Price

FREE

$49/month
$360/year

Save searches from
Google Scholar,
PubMed

Create lists to
organize your research

Export lists, citations

Read DeepDyve articles

Abstract access only

Unlimited access to over
18 million full-text articles

Print

20 pages / month

PDF Discount

20% off

Sign up
for free
Start 14 day
Free Trial