Irrational principals

Irrational principals Timothy Besley’s Principled Agents? carefully surveys the modern social science literature on political agency problems and tries to chart a sensible middle course between the naive assumption that politicians maximize the public welfare and the pessimism of Virginia-style public choice. However, the literature that Besley showcases is seriously flawed. By building on the empirically discredited rational expectations assumption, it neglects the strongest normative argument against political accountability and overlooks the extent to which “agency failures” stem from principal negligence. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Austrian Economics Springer Journals

Irrational principals

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Publisher
Springer US
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 by Springer Science+Business Media, LLC
Subject
Economics; Public Finance; Political Science; History of Economic Thought/Methodology
ISSN
0889-3047
eISSN
1573-7128
D.O.I.
10.1007/s11138-009-0073-9
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Timothy Besley’s Principled Agents? carefully surveys the modern social science literature on political agency problems and tries to chart a sensible middle course between the naive assumption that politicians maximize the public welfare and the pessimism of Virginia-style public choice. However, the literature that Besley showcases is seriously flawed. By building on the empirically discredited rational expectations assumption, it neglects the strongest normative argument against political accountability and overlooks the extent to which “agency failures” stem from principal negligence.

Journal

The Review of Austrian EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Feb 5, 2009

References

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