Introduction to Mini-Forum on German Banks

Introduction to Mini-Forum on German Banks Introduction to Mini-Forum on German Banks Jeremy Edwards The claim that German banks are different has that bank supervisory board representation and typically been made with reference to the large control of equity voting rights resulted in a greater German commercial banks. These banks control supply of external finance to AGs or a more effec- equity voting rights in German public companies tive system of corporate control. (AGs), either through owning shares themselves In both Edwards and Ogilvie (1996) and or through exercising proxy votes for shareholders Edwards and Fischer (1994), one component of who have deposited shares with them. Further- the argument that the distinctive institutional more, these banks are represented on the supervi- features of large German commercial banks have sory boards of AGs. It has been argued that these received too much emphasis derives from the distinctive institutional features give the large observation that only a relatively small proportion German commercial banks significant information of economic activity in Germany is carried out by about, and control over, the managers of AGs, AGs. AGs are the only German firms which are which enables them both to play an important role permitted to issue shares and are required http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Small Business Economics Springer Journals

Introduction to Mini-Forum on German Banks

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Publisher
Kluwer Academic Publishers
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Subject
Business and Management; Management; Microeconomics; Entrepreneurship; Industrial Organization
ISSN
0921-898X
eISSN
1573-0913
D.O.I.
10.1023/A:1007958430942
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Introduction to Mini-Forum on German Banks Jeremy Edwards The claim that German banks are different has that bank supervisory board representation and typically been made with reference to the large control of equity voting rights resulted in a greater German commercial banks. These banks control supply of external finance to AGs or a more effec- equity voting rights in German public companies tive system of corporate control. (AGs), either through owning shares themselves In both Edwards and Ogilvie (1996) and or through exercising proxy votes for shareholders Edwards and Fischer (1994), one component of who have deposited shares with them. Further- the argument that the distinctive institutional more, these banks are represented on the supervi- features of large German commercial banks have sory boards of AGs. It has been argued that these received too much emphasis derives from the distinctive institutional features give the large observation that only a relatively small proportion German commercial banks significant information of economic activity in Germany is carried out by about, and control over, the managers of AGs, AGs. AGs are the only German firms which are which enables them both to play an important role permitted to issue shares and are required

Journal

Small Business EconomicsSpringer Journals

Published: Oct 6, 2004

References

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