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Stefan Szymanski (2004)
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Rev Ind Organ (2009) 34:1–4 DOI 10.1007/s11151-009-9204-5 Victor J. Tremblay Published online: 14 February 2009 © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2009 Introduction: The Economics of Sports Study of professional sports has accelerated over the past several decades. Because of antitrust exemptions, team owners in the U.S. exert monopoly power by working collectively to sell the broadcasting rights of league games to television and radio stations. In the past, a reserve clause in an athlete’s contract bound the athlete to a club until the athlete was traded, released, or retired. This gave team owners monopsony power over player salaries, which led to the eventual formation of player unions, strike activity, and greater freedom for athletes to change teams. These issues as well as an abundance of data have driven the study of the economics of sports. Data on team revenues from broadcasting and from ticket and concession sales are available for many leagues. Player talent is a key component of team suc- cess, and player salaries, the largest component of team costs, are readily available. Although estimating a player’s marginal contribution to winning (called the marginal productivity of talent) is complicated by the fact that talent varies considerably from player
Review of Industrial Organization – Springer Journals
Published: Feb 14, 2009
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