Intentions and Permissibility: A Confusion of Moral Categories?

Intentions and Permissibility: A Confusion of Moral Categories? J Value Inquiry (2017) 51:577–591 DOI 10.1007/s10790-017-9596-7 Intentions and Permissibility: A Confusion of Moral Categories? Anton Markocˇ Published online: 16 May 2017 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 1 Introduction A common objection to the view that one’s intentions are non-derivatively relevant to the moral permissibility of one’s actions is that it confuses permissibility with other categories of moral evaluation, in particular, with blameworthiness or character assessment. The objection states that a failure to distinguish what one is permitted to do from what kind of a person one is, or from what one can be held blameworthy for, leads one to believe that intentions are relevant to permissibility when in fact they are only relevant to Intentions might be derivatively relevant to permissibility. The fact that one intends so and so might supervene on a more basic morally relevant fact, or be grounded on it, or indicate its occurrence (see for instance T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), chaps. 1–2.). The debate in question is only about the non-derivative or fundamental relevance of intentions. In what follows, when saying that intentions are relevant (or that they are not) I shall have in mind only non- http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Value Inquiry Springer Journals

Intentions and Permissibility: A Confusion of Moral Categories?

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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Subject
Philosophy; Ontology; Ethics; International Political Economy; Public International Law; Philosophy, general
ISSN
0022-5363
eISSN
1573-0492
D.O.I.
10.1007/s10790-017-9596-7
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

J Value Inquiry (2017) 51:577–591 DOI 10.1007/s10790-017-9596-7 Intentions and Permissibility: A Confusion of Moral Categories? Anton Markocˇ Published online: 16 May 2017 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 1 Introduction A common objection to the view that one’s intentions are non-derivatively relevant to the moral permissibility of one’s actions is that it confuses permissibility with other categories of moral evaluation, in particular, with blameworthiness or character assessment. The objection states that a failure to distinguish what one is permitted to do from what kind of a person one is, or from what one can be held blameworthy for, leads one to believe that intentions are relevant to permissibility when in fact they are only relevant to Intentions might be derivatively relevant to permissibility. The fact that one intends so and so might supervene on a more basic morally relevant fact, or be grounded on it, or indicate its occurrence (see for instance T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), chaps. 1–2.). The debate in question is only about the non-derivative or fundamental relevance of intentions. In what follows, when saying that intentions are relevant (or that they are not) I shall have in mind only non-

Journal

The Journal of Value InquirySpringer Journals

Published: May 16, 2017

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