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Michaël Dewally, Louis Ederington (2006)
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This paper explores how seller reputation affects auction prices using detailed Taiwanese data. Our empirical results show that returns to reputation are nonlinear and differ considerably across different reputation scores. Marginal returns to scores drop sharply after the first reputation quartile, indicating that building up sellers’ reputation is extremely important, especially in the early stage. Our study reveals that the mechanism of seller reputations is effective in mitigating asymmetric information in online auctions.
Small Business Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Jan 6, 2009
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